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ABSTRACT. In this essay, the author provides a working definition of philosophy from a cultural point of view, and argues
the need for mathematics educators to develop their philosophy of mathematics teaching and learning or, to speak more
broadly, their philosophy of education. He then historically situates three scholars—John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Michel
Foucault—who have been instrumental in the formulation of his philosophy of education. Next, he shares how the philoso-
phies of these three scholars provide different languages to critique three aspects of education. He concludes with brief discus-
sions on the process of his ever-evolving philosophy of mathematics teaching and learning and the emerging debates about the
“grand challenges” for mathematics education.
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learning
I. Introduction
Ever since being engaged in the profession of mathe-
matics education for the past 20 years or so, I have often
commented that an aspect of the problem regarding
“reform” in mathematics teaching and learning has been
what I perceive as a lack of conversations regarding a gen-
eral “philosophy of education” by those engaged in var-
ious reform efforts. Too often, mathematics education
reform efforts as well as discussions about and research on
mathematics teaching and learning generally appear to be
void of philosophical considerations. Higginson (1980),
however, with an aim toward improving both the intel-
lectual and the emotional mathematics learning experi-
ences for all students, argued for the inclusion of
philosophical considerations as an integral component of
mathematics teaching and learning.
Higginson (1980) began his argument with the “foun-
dation stone” of mathematics education: the question
“What is mathematics?” (p. 4) In responding to this foun-
dational question. Higginson provided an image of math-
ematics education as a tetrahedron in which the four faces
were the interrelated disciplines of mathematics, psychol-
ogy, sociology, and philosophy. He noted that allegiance to
mathematics is self-evident, and that the “battle for the
recognition of a psychological dimension in mathematics
education has been won, for almost all purposes, for some
time now” (p. 4). In regards to sociology, he stated, “the
recognition of the role of social and cultural factors is,
however, a process which is still ongoing” (p. 4). He then
made a two-pronged argument for the inclusion of a socio-
logical dimension: (a) the need to more fully understand
the social role of schooling and the inter- and intra-per-
sonal activity among teachers, students, and the mathe-
matics being taught and learned; and (b) the need to more
fully understand the influences of cultural values, eco-
nomic conditions, social structures, and emerging tech-
nologies on schools generally and on teaching and
learning specifically.
In arguing for the inclusion of philosophy, Higginson
(1980) cautiously noted that to some the gates have been
open too far already with the inclusion of sociological con-
siderations. Nonetheless, for Higginson the inclusion of
philosophical considerations in mathematics education
(reform or otherwise) is important because all human
“intellectual activity is based on some set of assumptions
of a philosophical type” (p. 4). These assumptions, he
stated:
will vary from discipline to discipline and between indi-
viduals and groups... . They may be explicitly acknowl-
edged or only tacitly so, but they will always exist.
Reduced to their essence these assumptions deal with con-
cerns such as the nature of “knowledge,” “being,”
“good,” “beauty,” “purpose” and “value”. More for-
mally we have, respectively, the fields of epistemology,
ontology, ethics, aesthetics, teleology and axiology. More
generally we have the issues of truth, certainty and logical
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consistency.
Similar to Higginson (1980), as a former high school
mathematics teacher and currently as a mathematics edu-
cation teacher educator and researcher, I am committed to
the idea that to ethically engage in reform efforts in math-
ematics teaching and learning, which should have as their
chief aim improving the mathematics learning experi-
ences and opportunities for every child, requires that the
mathematics teacher, teacher educator, and/or education
researcher (i.e., the mathematics educator) engage in the
task of developing a philosophy of mathematics teaching
and learning or, to speak more broadly, a philosophy of
education. 
In this essay, to assist other mathematics educators in
the task of developing a philosophy of education, I begin
by providing a working definition of philosophy from a
cultural point of view. I then historically situate three
scholars—John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Michel Fou-
cault—in the field of education; scholars who have been
instrumental in the formulation of my philosophy of edu-
cation. Next, I share how the philosophies of these three
scholars provide me with different languages to critique
three specific aspects of education. I conclude the dis-
cussion with an explanation of the process of developing
my own ever-evolving philosophy of mathematics teach-
ing and learning.
II. Defining Philosophy from 
a Cultural Point of View
Dewey (1934/1989) provided a working definition of
philosophy from a cultural point of view: a critique of
basic and widely shared beliefs and values that are
attached to customs and institutions within a social and
historical milieu. That is, philosophical assumptions such
as the nature of knowledge, being, good, beauty, and so
forth are best understood as socio-cultural and -historical
“significant cultural phenomena” (p. 29, emphasis added)
that change over time. The chief role of philosophy then
“is to bring to consciousness, in an intellectualized form,
or in the form of problems, the most important shocks and
inherent troubles of complex and changing societies” (p.
30). When philosophy serves this function, Dewey sug-
gested, systems “divide into the conserving and the rev-
olutionary” (p. 30). He claimed that some thinkers will
“preserve the values that are already embodied in the tra-
ditional, relatively established order…by setting forth
their rational justification” (p. 30). Other thinkers, how-
ever, “sometimes the most important of an entire gener-
ation, [who] are acutely conscious of the deficiencies and
corruptions of the existent order” will fashion their think-
ing in a manner that demonstrates the “necessity of rad-
ical changes and to pointing out the character of needed
reforms” (p. 30). In other words, Dewey believed that
although philosophy serves the purpose of preserving the
existing social order, it should also, and more importantly,
motivate radical change. 
As Dewey (1934/1974) explicitly argued for a philos-
ophy of education in his essay “The Need for a Philos-
ophy of Education,” he stated:
While the educator must use results that have already
been accomplished [she or] he cannot, if he is truly an
educator, make them his final and complete standard. Like
the artist he has the problem of creating something that is
not the exact duplicate of anything that has been wrought
and achieved previously. (p. 7)
I, too, believe that what is needed in education is the cre-
ation of something new and less duplication. My reflec-
tive readings of philosophers and education scholars, past
and present, coupled with life experiences, undergraduate
and graduate coursework, and collegial discussions have
provided me the opportunity to develop a philosophy of
education that aims at achieving an education that has not
been wrought or achieved previously. In doing so, I
clearly understand that developing a philosophy of edu-
cation means making choices among different and often-
times conflicting perspectives about the purposes of
education (Dewey & Childs, 1933/1989). 
Consequently, while choosing the perspectives that
have been instrumental to my developing philosophy of
education, I acknowledge the complexity of the issue of
impartiality. Dewey and Childs (1933/1989) argued:
The scheme of education itself cannot be impartial in the
sense of not involving preference for some values over
others. The obligation to be impartial is the obligation to
state as clearly as possible what is chosen and why it is
chosen. …It will be helpful if those who disagree in prac-
tice, in the courses of action they are following, will also
clarify and expose the grounds for their polices: in short,
develop and formulate their philosophies of education. (p.
78, emphasis in original) 
In other words, when making education choices, I do not
have the means of being impartial. That is, the reasons
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for making the choices that I or anyone for that matter
make are always shaped and informed by her or his posi-
tionality, experiences, and morals and values. I believe
that as those who are engaged in the profession of edu-
cation debate various perspectives regarding the pur-
poses of (mathematics) education that the debates should
not be centered around whose perspective is “right” or
“wrong,” but rather around what are the ontological,
epistemological, and ethical bases, that is, the philo-
sophical basis, (Paul & Marfo, 2001) for why one per-
spective is chosen over another. Engaging in debates of
this sort requires the formulation of a philosophy of edu-
cation, as suggested by Dewey and Childs, resulting, I
believe, in more productive debates about mathematics
teaching and learning. 
III. Situating Dewey, Freire, and Foucault 
in Education
If one argued that Plato’s philosophy established the
concept of public education in Western thought, and that
Jefferson’s philosophy established the concept of public
education in the United States, then one could argue that
Dewey’s philosophy, “comparable in scope and depth to
that of Plato” (Cahn, 1991, p. xviii), established how pub-
lic education would be debated in the United States during
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As one of the
founders of the philosophical school of pragmatism, John
Dewey (1859−1952) was a prolific writer who contrib-
uted to the fields of philosophy, psychology, and educa-
tion. He established the University Elementary School at
the University of Chicago in 1896 (renamed the Labora-
tory School in 1902), which established his national and
international prominence in education (Jackson, 1990).
Although it has been argued that Dewey’s philosophy has
had minimal influence in the actual practices of schools
(Jackson, 1990; Kliebard, 1995; Spring, 1991), his phi-
losophy “earned [him] a place in the panoply of the
world’s great educators” (Kliebard, 1995, p. 27). Kliebard
(1995) suggested that one of the reasons for the limited
influence on actual school practice was due to Dewey’s
“considerable departure from the main line of any of the
established [education] movements” (p. 26) of the first
part of the twentieth century. 
Kliebard (1995) identified four movements that were
“struggling” for the American curriculum at the turn of the
twentieth century: (a) the humanist, who emphasized the
classic traditional disciplines of knowledge found in
Western philosophy; (b) the developmentalist, who
emphasized the “natural” development of the child; (c) the
social efficiency educators, who emphasized a “scien-
tific” approach toward the “natural” development of
social stratification; and (d) the social meliorists, who
emphasized education as a means of working toward
social justice. Kliebard suggested that Dewey’s position
in matters of curriculum was an “integration and espe-
cially a reinterpretation” (p. 26) of these four movements.
Ironically, it was probably due to the fact that Dewey “was
not a man who chose sides easily” (p. 26) that still makes
his philosophy so influential in the debate of education in
the twenty-first century. Jackson (1990) argued that
Dewey’s philosophy of education extended beyond
schools: “It is also a vision of what our whole society
might be like if we all worked at it and how ours schools
might contribute to that noble end [a more just society]”
(p. xxxv).
Perceiving education as a means toward a more just
society was also an integral element in the scholarship and
philosophy of Paulo Freire (1921−1997). Influenced in
part by the writings of Dewey, Freire has been identified
as “the most important educator of the second half of [the
twentieth] century” (Carnoy, 2000, p. 7) and “one of the
great revolutionaries of our generation” (McLaren, 1997,
p. 101). It is the coupling of these two descriptors, edu-
cator and revolutionary, that best characterizes Freire and
his scholarship. Freire was a Brazilian born no-armchair
professor (i.e., “reflection without action is empty ‘ver-
balism’” [Crotty, 1998, p. 147]) of history and education
who was significantly influenced by the works of Marx
and Gramsci (Crotty, 1998). His initial engagement in
education was through the development of a literacy cam-
paign for the “peasants” of northeastern Brazil during the
late 1950s and early 1960s. Based on the campaign’s suc-
cess it was adopted by Brazil’s Ministry of Education in
1963 and showed great promise in transforming the eco-
nomic structure of Brazil (Gadotti, 1994). The military
coup d'état of 1964, however, toppled the Brazilian gov-
ernment and forced Freire into exile. 
While in exile for 16 years, first in Chile and then time
spent in Switzerland and the United States, Freire con-
tinued to work and write for social transformation and jus-
tice through education. The publication of the English
translation of Pedagogy of the Oppressed in 1970 distin-
guished him as an education scholar on the international
front. 
Freire’s education philosophy has been influential in
Third World countries since the 1960s and began to
become influential in First World countries in the 1980s as
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part of the critical educational and pedagogical move-
ment. This movement is rooted in the social and political
critique of the Frankfurt School (circa 1920), which holds
a Marxist theoretical perspective: to critique and subvert
domination in all its forms (Bottomore, 2001). Skovs-
mose (1994), drawing from the work of Freire (and oth-
ers), defined the “most general and uniting idea” of a
critical education:
If education, as both a practice and research, should be
critical it must discuss basic conditions for obtaining
knowledge, it must be aware of social problems, inequal-
ities, suppression etc., and it must try to make education
an active progressive social force. A critical education
cannot be a simple prolongation of existing social rela-
tionships. It cannot be an apparatus for prevailing
inequalities in society. To be critical, education must react
to social contradictions. (pp. 37−38)
Overall, Freire’s scholarship has influenced countless
educators within the United States and throughout the
world. His philosophy of education characterizes knowl-
edge as a never ceasing social and emancipatory process
in which humans through critical thinking learn to read
and write their worlds with the aim of transformation
toward a more just society. In closing his last book Teach-
ers as Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who Dare
Teach published posthumously, Freire (1998) concluded:
“Knowing has everything to do with growing. But the
knowing of dominant minorities absolutely must not pro-
hibit, must not asphyxiate, must not castrate the growing
of the immense dominated majorities” (p. 95).
The scholarship and philosophy of Michel Foucault
(1926−1984), a French political and social activist and
philosopher, is also rooted in the social and political cri-
tique of the Frankfurt School with an emphasis on a struc-
turalist Marxist critique of humanism of the Enlightenment.
The Student and Worker’s Revolt of 1968 in Paris, how-
ever, dramatically changed the frame of structuralist phi-
losophy, significantly impacting Foucault and others who
later would become known as post-structuralists (e.g.,
Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Julia
Kristeva, Jean-François Lyotard).1) The failed 1968
Revolt brought about a rethinking and ultimately aban-
donment of the Marxist structuralist critique with its anal-
ysis of economic structures, and was replaced by a post-
structuralist critique of the discursively constituted sub-
ject and the deconstruction of cultural symbols and hier-
archies (Belsey, 2002; Sarup, 1983). Deconstruction,
generally speaking, works to unsettle and displace cul-
tural symbols and hierarchies, to uncover their histori-
cally contingent origin and politically charged roles, not to
provide a “better” foundation for knowledge and society,
but rather to dislodge their dominance, creating a social
space that demonstrates its tolerance of difference, ambi-
guity, and playful innovations (Seidman, 1994).
Foucault, “never a structuralist strictly speaking, or a
post-structuralist” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv),
was significantly influenced by the works of Nietzsche.
Foucault’s critiques on the discursively constituted human
subject, knowledge, history, and sexuality used an anal-
ysis of power and the methods of archeology and gene-
alogy, which were derivatives of Nietzsche’s scholarship
(Crotty, 1998). Throughout all of Foucault’s critiques he
encouraged one to think the unthought, to think: “how is it
that one particular statement appeared rather than another”
(Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 27)? Clifford Geertz, the renowned
American anthropologist, in the New York Review of
Books in January 1978 characterized Foucault as “a kind
of impossible object: a nonhistorical historian, an anti-
humanist human scientist, and a counter-structuralist
structuralist…the difficult of his work arises not only
from self-regard…but from a powerful and genuine orig-
inality of thought” (quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983,
p. xviii-xix). Rorty suggested, “Foucault can be read…as
an up-to-date version of John Dewey” (quoted in Thomas,
1997, p. 98). While St. Pierre (2004) argued, “both Fou-
cault and his readers are multiple and changing, master-
ing Foucault is impossible” (p. 325). The scholarship of
Foucault as well as all those who are “identified” as post-
structuralists has only been taken up within the U.S. edu-
cation framework for the past three decades or so. It will
be interesting to observe how the poststructuralist critique
of humanism will be played-out in schools and class-
rooms as educators struggle to think the unthought of U.S.
education.
IV. Engaging Dewey, Freire, and Foucault 
in a Philosophy of Education
The scholarship of Dewey, Freire, and Foucault has
been instrumental in the formulation of my philosophy of
education. Individually and collectively their scholarship
made available new languages. For instance, Dewey
1) None of the philosophers listed would claim the label of post-
structuralist, with the exception of Lyotard who claimed the
label postmodernist.
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(1933/1989) provided the language of reflective thinking:
“active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief
or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds
that support it and the further conclusion to which it tends”
(p. 118). Freire (1970/2000) provided the language of crit-
ical thinking: “learning to perceive social, political, and
economic contradictions, and to take action against the
oppressive elements of reality” (p. 35). And Foucault
(1969/1972) provided the language of divergent thinking:
“The description of the events of discourse poses a quite
different question: how is it that one particular statement
appeared rather than another?” (p. 27). This acquisition of
different languages has provided me with the ability to
engage in critical reflections on my lived experiences,
resulting in the rewording of my world (Freire, 1970/
2000). The consequence of rewording my world with the
languages of reflection, critique, and difference has
resulted in my rethinking the purposes and possibilities of
education, amending my (what I now understand to be)
ever-evolving philosophy of education. 
While providing a means of rethinking education by
contributing new languages, the scholarship of Dewey,
Freire, and Foucault has also contributed by providing
specific critiques on three aspects of education: the pur-
pose of schools (e.g., Dewey, 1916), the role of pedagogy
(e.g., Freire, 1970/2000), and the nature of knowledge
(e.g., Foucault, 1969/1972), respectively. In making the
foregoing statement, I do not intend to suggest that Dewey
only critiqued education with respect to the purpose of
schools; Freire, only with respect to the role of pedagogy;
and Foucault, only with respect to the nature of knowl-
edge. Clearly, the philosophy of each of these three schol-
ars is comprehensive and complex, addressing not only
the concepts that I have mentioned but also much of
human thought and action. Nonetheless, for the purpose
of this discussion that aims to shed some light on the effect
that each of these scholars has had on my developing phi-
losophy of education, I have limited the discussion to
these three concepts.
Dewey’s philosophy has significantly influenced how I
think about the purpose of schools. He argued that the
chief theme for consideration of the problem of education
should be for schools to attain “clarity concerning the con-
crete significance of democracy” (Dewey 1937/1987, p.
416). Dewey suggested, rather than take “democracy for
granted,” thinking and acting as if the forefathers had
founded it once for all, that the ideal of democracy “has to
be enacted anew in every generation” (p. 416). And, for
Dewey, the concept of enacting anew the ideal of democ-
racy meant directing social change toward a more equi-
table and just society. While acknowledging the powerful
forces outside the school that effect the possibility of
enacting anew this ideal, Dewey vehemently argued that
although school is not a “sufficient condition, it is a nec-
essary condition” (p. 414) in directing social change.
Dewey (1934/1974) explicitly stated: 
Unless the schools of the world can engage in a common
effort to rebuild the spirit of common understanding, of
mutual sympathy and goodwill among all people and
races, to exercise [sic] the demon of prejudice, isolation
and hatred, the schools themselves are likely to be sub-
merged by the general return to barbarism. (p. 14)
I agree with Dewey’s argument to make the chief theme in
schools creating anew the ideal of democracy while
rebuilding the spirit of common understanding, mutual
sympathy, and goodwill among all people and races.
Freire’s philosophical perspective has provided the
frame for my rethinking the role of pedagogy. He strongly
criticized the most often used form of pedagogy, which he
identified as the “‘banking’ concept of education” (Freire,
1970/2000, p. 72). This concept of education positions
students as passive and empty receptacles eagerly await-
ing the teacher’s deposits of knowledge. Freire, on the
other hand, argued for a problem-posing pedagogy in
which Subjects2) “develop their power to perceive criti-
cally the way they exist in the world with which and in
which they find themselves” (p. 83). A problem-posing
pedagogy is dialogical, reconfiguring the “traditional”
teacher-student roles. In a problem-posing pedagogy,
Freire claimed:
The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but
one who is [herself or] himself taught in dialogue with the
students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They
become jointly responsible for the process in which all
grow. …Here, no one teaches another, nor is anyone self-
taught. People teach each other. (p. 80)
I agree with Freire’s challenge to teachers to develop
learning environments in which teachers and students
alike become teachers and learners. Freire (1970/2000)
suggested that the dialogical nature of problem-posing
2) Freire (1970/2000) defined Subjects, with a capital S, as “those
who know and act in contrast to objects, which are known and
acted upon.—Translator’s note” (p. 36).
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pedagogy affirms subjects (teachers and students) “as
beings in the process of becoming—as unfinished, uncom-
pleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality” (p.
84, emphasis in original). Freire’s reconfiguration of the
roles of pedagogy resonates with my own thinking. Ped-
agogy should facilitate the development of reflective and
critical life-long learning by teachers and students alike.
Freire believed, as I do, that this reconfiguration of ped-
agogical roles transforms education into a liberating
praxis—reflection followed by action, followed by reflec-
tion, followed by action, and so on—resulting in the
humanization of teachers and students.
Foucault’s philosophy has been instrumental in my
rethinking the nature of knowledge. Foucault (1969/1972)
replaced the concept of the “nature” of knowledge with
the “discursive formation” (p. 38) of knowledge. In other
words, Foucault rejected the “natural” concepts of knowl-
edge found in humanism, such as Descartes’ dualism of
mind-body, which argues that the thinking subject is the
authentic author of knowledge, or Comte’s positivism,
which rejects knowledge produced within the realms of
theology and metaphysics in favor of a scientific knowl-
edge gained from methodologically observing the sensi-
ble universe (St. Pierre, 2000). Foucault uncovered
knowledge as a discursive formation through the means of
performing an archeological analysis—a method that
examines the history of a discourse. But rather than being
concerned with uncovering the “truth” by an examination
of facts and dates, archeology is concerned with the “his-
torical conditions, assumptions, and power relations that
allow certain statements, and by extension, certain dis-
courses to appear” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 496). To clarify the
limits of discursive formations, Foucault wrote:
The field of discursive events…is a grouping that is
always finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic
sequences that have been formulated; they may be innu-
merable, they may, in sheer size, exceed the capacities of
recording, memory, or reading: nevertheless they form a
finite grouping. (p. 27)
In effect, knowledge viewed as a discursive formation no
longer maintains its privileged status as an “objective”
reality, but knowledge itself becomes subjected to and
limited by the very historical and sociocultural assump-
tions, conditions, and power relations against which nat-
ural knowledge within the humanist tradition claimed
immunity.
As a mathematics educator, I have rethought and
reworded—with and through the languages of reflection,
critique, and difference—the purpose of schools, the role
of pedagogy, and the nature of knowledge. This rethink-
ing and rewording is evident across my research and
scholarship where I champion and apply non-traditional
theories and methodologies to move the mathematics edu-
cation community into fuller theoretical and practical
understandings of how the intersectionalities of race,
class, gender, ethnicity, language, and so forth come into
play in mathematics and mathematics teaching and learn-
ing. This work includes justifications for culturally rele-
vant and critical/social justice mathematics teaching (e.g.,
Stinson, 2004; Stinson, Bidwell, & Powell, 2012; Wager
& Stinson, 2012), explorations of how sociocultural dis-
courses and discursive practices influence mathematics
achievement and persistence (e.g., Stinson, 2006, 2008,
2013), and proposals for critical postmodern theory and
methods in mathematics education research (e.g., Stin-
son, 2009; Stinson & Bullock, 2012, 2015). The aim in all
of this work is to assist in transforming mathematics from
an instrument of social stratification to an instrument of
self-empowerment (Stinson, 2004).
V. In the End, an Ever-Evolving Philosophy
As I have singled out the scholarship of Dewey, Freire,
and Foucault, one should not infer that these are the only
scholars who have influenced my thinking, for there have
been many, but these three scholars have had substantial
impact. Nor is the discussion intended to suggest that the
aspects of the concepts that I have highlighted reflect a
complete picture of how each of these scholars reconcep-
tualized these human concerns. Furthermore, one should
not infer from the discussion that I currently agree with all
aspects of their philosophies or that I will in the future. My
philosophy is changing concurrently with my understand-
ing of theirs. Indeed, the attributes of change and growth,
and contradiction, are reoccurring aspects found in their
philosophies—as well as in mine. But we are in good
company: “Nietzsche…argued that consistency in a
thinker is more a symptom of a disease than a theoretical
virtue” (Orton, 1995, p. 227).
In view of the fact that I have implied that the attributes
of change, growth, contradiction, and even inconsistency
are positive attributes found within my philosophy of edu-
cation, one might ask: What then is the purpose of a phi-
losophy of education? Dewey and Childs (1933/1987)
argued that the purpose, or “business,” of a philosophy of
education is 
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to make clear what is involved in the action which is car-
ried on within the educational field, to transform a pref-
erence which is blind, based on custom rather than
thought, into an intelligent choice—one made, that is,
with consciousness of what is aimed at, the reasons why it
is preferred, and the fitness of the means used. (p. 78) 
With Dewey and Child’s remark in mind, what I have
developed within the context of a philosophy of educa-
tion is a philosophical statement of education. This state-
ment is similar to the mission statement of an
organization, which ideally is meant to reflect its vision
and drive its actions. This statement of education acts as a
guide as I make choices that abandon the restraints of
what is “customarily” done in schools, in order to embrace
intelligent possibilities—that is, possibilities that are con-
sistent with my evolving philosophy of education—of
what might be achieved in and through schools. In other
words, it serves as a checkpoint to ensure that the choices I
make within the context of education are intelligent
choices rather than choices that are blind—based on cus-
tom rather than thought (cf. Dewey 1934/1989). If I per-
ceive a contradiction between my actions and statement, I
make an assessment as to the soundness of the actions, the
statement, or both, making modifications when ethically
necessary. 
This constant assessment as to the ethics of my actions
against my philosophy of education keeps my philosophy
of education in motion. In other words, although this dis-
cussion attempted to present the development of my phi-
losophy of education in a linear fashion, in actuality it has
no beginning or end, just a middle (Deleuze & Guattari,
1980/1987). Or understood in another way, it will always
be a work in progress. Each time I read and reread a book,
essay, or interview by Dewey, Freire, or Foucault (and
others) I am impelled into critical reflection—rethinking
my rethinking. And ever since Foucault entered into the
picture, I attempt to think the unthought. St. Pierre sug-
gested that we get smarter as we read, and as we reread we
will always find something different because we have
changed since the last reading (E. A. St. Pierre, personal
communication, fall 2002). But then again, as I read and
reread text, I no longer have “dreams of deciphering a
truth or an origin”; but rather, I think about how the text
offers a different way of seeing, trying “to pass beyond
man and humanism” (Derrida, 1978, p. 292). Presently, I
am reconciling old and discovering new contradictions
concurrently within my philosophy; nevertheless, my
continued intimacy with Dewey, Freire, and Foucault will
unendingly influence my ever-evolving philosophy of
education. 
VI. Coda
Recently, in mathematics education—similar to disci-
plines such as engineering, chemistry, health, and oth-
ers—there have been discussions about what might be the
“grand challenges” for mathematics teaching and learn-
ing in the twenty-first century. Over the past couple of
years, the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
Research Committee has been spearheading the discus-
sion for the larger mathematics education community. In
the summer of 2014, the committee sent a brief survey to a
broad range of members of the community to assist the
committee in framing what grand challenges in mathe-
matics education might “look like.” In the March 2015
issue of the Journal for Research in Mathematics Edu-
cation the committee formally outlined their efforts thus
far in the commentary “Grand Challenges and Opportu-
nities in Mathematics Education Research” (Stephan et
al., 2015). 
In summarizing their efforts, the Research Committee
(Stephan et al., 2015) provided both justifications and
cautions of developing a list per se of grand challenges. In
the end, they acknowledged that although dangerous not
developing a list is not an option. In short, they warned, “If
we do not set forth an agenda as a community, others cer-
tainly will” (p. 144). Although the process of developing a
list is still undecided, the committee provided some pos-
sible grand challenges themes and a hypothetical grand
challenge based on an analysis of the initial survey data.
The three possible themes were (a) changing perceptions
about what it means to do mathematics, (b) changing the
public’s perception about the role of mathematics in soci-
ety, and (c) achieving equity in mathematics education (p.
139). The hypothetical challenge was “All students will be
mathematical literate by the completion of eighth grade”
(p. 140).
The language alone in both the themes and the hypo-
thetical simply demonstrate the need for those who are
and will be engaged in the grand challenges debates to
develop and formulate their philosophies of (mathemat-
ics) education (cf. Dewey & Childs, 1933/1989).
Reponses to questions such as what does it mean to do
mathematics, what is the role of mathematics in society,
how is equity in mathematics achieved, and what is math-
ematical literacy, are not detached from a person’s phil-
osophical assumptions and choices about the meaning of
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knowledge, being, good, beauty, purpose, value, and so
forth. As the Research Committee (Stephan et al., 2015)
noted, “It is clear to us that people’s theoretical orienta-
tions, ideologies, epistemologies, and values will shape
what they might put forward” (p. 143). Therefore, given
that impartiality is impossible, as argued by Dewey and
Childs (1933/1989), it will be helpful if those who cham-
pion different assumptions and choices during the debates
clarify and expose the grounds for their philosophies of
(mathematics) education.
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